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Abstract The establishment of autonomous public bodies during the past two
decades has created a highly fragmented public sector. Using a dataset with more
than 200 Dutch public sector organisations, this article examines three related sets of
questions: to what extent a relationship exists between formal and de facto
autonomy; the level of influence that interested parties exert upon those
organizations; whether a relationship exists between levels of formal and de facto
autonomy and the level of influence exercised by these parties. We find that formal
autonomy does not reinforce de facto autonomy; organizations with less autonomy
report higher levels of political influence when policy autonomy is concerned; and
that organizations with more autonomy report higher societal influence on their
financial autonomy.
Keywords Bureaucratic autonomy . Political control . Public sector organizations
The political control of public administration is one of the most central concerns of
students of politics and administration since the days of Wilson and Weber. On both
sides of the Atlantic, fear of unresponsive and runaway bureaucracy has prompted
several research endeavors in the past century leading to much bureaucrat-bashing
(Niskanen 1971). Ironically, the implementation of a neo-liberal agenda within the
public sector, i.e. privatizations, liberalization and New Public Management, further
deepened skepticism about responsive bureaucracy instead of bringing the
bureaucrat under control—which was the alleged objective. Political reformers
hived off departmental units from ministries, created highly specialized organiza-
tions, and delegated substantial degrees of autonomy to these bodies (Pollitt and
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Bouckaert 2004; Majone 1994; Levi-Faur 2005). The creation of autonomous and
specialized bodies diminished leverage for political control and increased problems
of coordination within the public sector (Christensen and Laegreid 2006). Today, the
public administrations of advanced capitalist economies offer a fragmented and
multifaceted view: the public sector is inhabited by a multitude of organizations with
different designs, created by different legal instruments, and with different financial
and budgetary regimes (OECD 2002; Whettenhall 2003). The quest for political
control has become even larger than it was several decades ago.
However, to what extent is this rather pessimistic view of regulatory reform true?
Has the state really been “hollowed out”? Did the large-scale decentralizations,
privatizations and agencifications during the 1980s and 1990s really bring
“potentially dramatic changes” for the “capacity [of the central state] to steer the
system—its capacity for governance” (Rhodes 1994: 149)? The ‘hollowing out the
state’ thesis states that the central state has become one of the many public and
private actors active within policy networks. The center can no longer govern by
command but must rely upon its negotiation and persuasive skills because
policymaking involves so many (new) stakeholders (Weller et al. 1997). While the
reforms that were implemented during these years did have a lasting impact on
relationships between politicians and bureaucrats, many authors argue that these
changes did not lead to a hollowing out, but rather a reassertion of the center.
Tendencies towards hollowing out the state have been countervailed by more
“regulation inside government” (Hood et al. 1999). The central state put a halt to the
dissipation of powers and discretionary authority to (semi)-autonomous agencies by
strengthening internal controls and monitoring systems. And finally, new reforms
such as the “whole-of-government” programs or the search for “joined-up”
government were implemented to restore central control (Halligan 2006; Christensen
and Laegreid 2007).
In this article we will examine the influence of political actors on public sector
organizations in the Netherlands. We will present findings of a survey conducted
among 219 semi-autonomous public sector organizations in this country. The
majority of these organizations are fully or semi-autonomous from political oversight
and have been created during the past twenty years. We are particularly interested in
the following three sets of questions: (1) What is the relationship between the formal
and de facto autonomy of public sector organizations in the Netherlands? Are
formally more autonomous organizations also de facto more autonomous? The
second set of questions concerns the extent to which actors or stakeholders in the
environment of these organizations affect the autonomy of these organizations: (2)
Which venues of influence, i.e. important stakeholders/actors, do exist in the
environment of public sector organizations and how much influence do they exert on
these organizations? Our third and final question focuses on the relationship between
the perceived degree of influence exerted by these venues and the level of autonomy
reported by these organizations: (3) Are organizations with more formal autonomy
influenced less by actors (e.g. their stakeholders) in their environment?
These questions will be addressed in separate sections. But first we will discuss a
body of literature that is of American origin but which has developed into a number
of important systematic approaches to model to measure the relationships between
political control and bureaucratic autonomy. Then we will describe the background
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of our case study (the Dutch parliamentary system and the examined public sector
organizations) and this study’s methodology (i.e. survey analysis). The article ends
with a conclusion.
Analyzing influence on public sector organizations: an overview of US studies
While there is no shortage of academic studies on the relationship between
politicians and public bureaucracy in parliamentary systems, there are relatively
few studies that offer systematically collected and analyzed data on political
influence and bureaucratic autonomy. Mainstream research in the field of political-
administrative relationships in parliamentary settings is descriptive and institutional
at heart (Pollit and Bouckaert 2004; ‘t Hart and Wille 2006; Peters and Pierre 2004).
It is for this reason that we turn to US studies of political influence. There, studies
of political influence formed a reaction to the view that bureaucracy was out of
control. It was assumed that Congress would fail to control the bureaucracy because
of “the haphazard nature of the oversight activities that did take place, the lack of
expertise by members of Congress and their staffs, and the disregards of bureaucrats
for their members” (Miller 2005: 209). The ‘congressional dominance’ literature
showed however that Congress was actually able to exert control over the
bureaucracy, both ex post and ex ante. Ex post control occurred through the
appropriation process, legislation and legislative changes, and oversight hearings
(Weingast and Moran 1983; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991) and ex ante controls
were found in agency design, administrative procedures, audits and compulsory
reporting (McCubbins 1985; McCubbins et al. 1987). The debate revolved around
the question whether Congress should apply a “police patrol” or “fire alarms”
approach, i.e. whether Congress should pro-actively monitor agencies (patrol) or
whether it should wait until interest groups would rung the bells about agency (mis)
behavior (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). In response to the congressional
dominance school, presidential influence theories of political control argued that
Presidential influence on bureaucracy flowed through the authority to appoint
agency directors, reorganization, and budgetary powers (Moe 1985; Lewis 2003).
Both congressional dominance and presidential influence studies, however,
focused on just one single principal and one single agent. By contrast, Hammond
and Knott (1996: 163) concluded that bureaucratic autonomy is a “contingent
matter” depending on the strategies pursued by the President, the House and the
Senate. Under some circumstances agencies may enjoy more autonomy than under
other circumstances, but political control is always a matter of “joint custody” of
president, Congress and the courts (Wood and Waterman 1991; Hammond and Knott
1996; Furlong 1998). Therefore, political influence should be modeled in terms of
‘venues of influence’, because bureaucratic agencies report to be influenced by
“differently perceived sets of principals” (Waterman et al. 1998: 19).
So, there are more actors than formal governmental principals alone, for example
interest groups, clients and citizens, courts and the media. Furlong (1998) has
measured the relative influence of these actors, the president and Congress on twelve
federal agencies. He asked randomly selected respondents from the agencies to rate
the relative influence of the different actors and found a clear distinction between the
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influence of Congress and the president on the one hand, and the courts, interest
groups and the general public on the other. He found that Congress and president,
the two core political principals, have the highest influence on public organizations.
Waterman et al. (1998) support these findings. In two surveys, they asked the
employees of two environmental protection agencies to rate the degree of influence
on their agency by a number of political and administrative actors and found that
“agents do not perceive that influence is exerted solely by each separate principal in
a dyadic fashion; rather bureaucrats perceive that certain types of principals … exert
similar forms of influence” (Waterman et al. 1998: 23)
Political influence analysis in a parliamentary context: The Netherlands
In this article, we will follow a similar approach as Furlong and Waterman et al. Our
aim is to partially replicate these studies but now for a parliamentary system, namely
the Netherlands. There are several reasons why the Dutch case is interesting. First,
the Dutch political system is a parliamentary democracy of the consociational type.
Over time, it has consistently produced multiparty governments that were founded
upon stable, often oversized, parliamentary majority coalitions (Lijphart 1999;
Andeweg and Irwin 2005).
An important difference compared to the US system is the ministerial portfolio
system. In the US presidential system a clear separation of powers between the
executive and legislative branches juxtaposes President and Congress on a relatively
equal footing. In the Dutch parliamentary system however, the legislature and the
executive are more or less ‘lined up’ with the latter being fully responsible and
dependent upon the legislature through a vote of confidence.1 A singular chain of
delegation runs from voters to parliament, from parliament to cabinet, from cabinet
leadership to individual minister, and from the individual minister to the
bureaucracy. This is known as the “the singularity principle” (Strøm 2000). At the
executive end of the chain, individual ministers are the “relevant privileged actors”
(Laver and Shepsle 1996). This system makes a minister an agent of parliament but
at the same time a principal for the bureaucracy that is assigned to her portfolio. The
autonomy of bureaucratic agencies is hence significantly dependent on the formal
powers of the minister, as ministers are ultimately responsible for the decisions,
actions and behaviour of bureaucrats residing under their authority.
Interest groups may also exert influence upon public sector organizations. Ideally-
typically, interest groups in the US compete for access to governmental decision-
making centers. In Europe, politicians delegate formal authority to representatives of
interest organizations to take part in formal policymaking processes. Interest
organizations are represented in extra-parliamentary consultative bodies and in the
governing boards of executive agencies. They are co-producers of public policies
together with governmental actors in the areas of their interest. Of course, neither the
US nor the European system can be characterized as purely pluralist or purely
corporatist—there are much more flavors than these two (van Waarden 1992).
1 This is the case in the Netherlands. In other parliamentary democracies, e.g. where minority governments
are the norm such as in Scandinavian countries, the situation is somewhat different.
140 K. Yesilkagit, S. van Thiel
Moreover, the relationships between interest groups and politics are not static and
change over time (Christiansen and Rommetvedt 1999; Molina and Rhodes 2002).
Whatever the shape of pressure group politics, interest groups are expected to exert
influence on public sector organizations.
Next to the aforementioned actors we will consider the role of consultants, public
opinion, clients, target groups, and the media. The influence of consultants on public
sector organizations is rarely studied, although in the Netherlands 760 million euro
was spent in 2002 on external advice. Consultants study both organizational reforms
and policy evaluations, and may thus exert influence on public sector organizations.
The media may exert political influence by bringing news, i.e. events and possible
scandals, to the fore. The impact of the media on public sector organizations
however is expected to run through political channels, i.e. by parliamentarians
confronting ministers with the news. Citizens have frequent contacts with public
sector organizations as clients or as target groups. We therefore expect that public
organizations with large client groups will be affected by their clients. Finally,
seemingly indirect and deluded, but nevertheless important may be the influence of
public opinion.
Methodology
Survey administration
In May–June 2006 we carried out a survey among Dutch public sector organisations.
The web-based questionnaire consisted of 50 questions on different topics including,
among others, agencies discretionary authority to select target groups and policy
instruments; the financial system in use; third party influence; participation in the EU
policy process; audit and accountability arrangements; organizational culture;
influence on the development of new policies; position and role of the board; and
the use of a large number of management techniques like performance indicators,
HRM and quality care.2 In this paper we only use the data that pertain to autonomy
and external influence. Data were analysed using SPSS 15.0.
We sent the survey to all known public sector organizations in the Netherlands.3
621 organisations were identified using earlier research and government documents
and websites. Of 47 organizations the addresses were wrong (29); 8 organizations
declined to cooperate. In the end, the survey was send to 574 organizations. The
survey was filled out by respondents from 219 organizations, of which 14 returned
the questionnaire by mail (total response rate 38%).4 We eliminated one group
of organizations, namely Statutory Trade Associations and Water Boards because
2 This questionnaire is part of an international comparative study into the autonomy and steering of public
sector organizations (PSOs). The survey had been carried out before in Belgium, Norway, and Ireland (see
www.publicmanagament-cobra.org). The survey focuses on PSOs at national level only.
3 Of course, some minor organizations may well have been overlooked. The dataset, however, contains the
most comprehensive overview of these bodies in the Netherlands for the period under research (2006).
4 As the response rate for the different types of public sector organisations was not statistically
significantly different from their proportion in the population, the sample is considered representative.
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of their special constitutional position. This caused a drop in the response rate of
only 2%.
The survey raises some potential concerns. The first and perhaps most important
concern is that this is a survey with which we aim to measure something that in
reality may be dynamic and highly political: the autonomy of agencies. The level of
autonomy is often contingent upon specific political situations and developments.
Events or crises may suddenly emerge and lead ministers to renege on the agreed
upon terms of autonomy (Majone 2001). A survey cannot capture political salience
in such a dynamic fashion. However, we can assume that the representative sample
of public sector organizations in our dataset also shows a cross-section of politically
salient and non-salient organizations and/or tasks.
There are three more issues regarding the representativeness of our data. First, the
response rate per question varies. For example, the question concerning the
autonomy of the organization in selecting a policy’s target group was answered by
143 respondents (25%) but a similar question about choosing policy instruments by
only 108 organizations (19%). This may cause bias. Therefore, we have weighted
responses per type of organization and thus simulated proportionate responses from
each type of organization. We did not find any statistically significant differences
between the weighted and unweighted samples, though, so bias will be limited.
Second, 85 organizations (39%) belonged to a cluster of organizations; regionally
based independent bodies with the exact same legal basis.5 In order to correct for
overestimation, we calculated aggregated values for each cluster. However, when we
compared the results with non-aggregated values we found no significant difference.
Third, we sent the survey to the directors of the organizations. 46% of the surveys
were answered by the directors themselves. Some of the questions called for specific
knowledge for example on financial and personnel issues and were therefore
answered by qualified financial and personnel officers (4%). In some cases, it was
the assistant or secretary to the board of directors who filled in the survey questions
(23%). Some of the organizations are headed by a chairperson, who was invited to
fill out the questionnaire (12%). Differences in type of respondents may obviously
cause bias, but in the case when answering the questionnaire was delegated we
assume that the person best suited to answer the survey was charged with it.
The organizations in the survey: formal autonomy
The organisations in the survey can be grouped into four categories, based on their
legal statutes. This division coincides with an increasing degree of formal (legal)
autonomy (cf. Christensen and Yesilkagit 2006:208): contract agencies, independent
administrative bodies, legal entities with a statutory task and government
foundations. Contract Agencies (in Dutch: agentschappen) have no legal personality
and all their decisions are subject to full ministerial accountability. They are former
directorates of ministries. Their autonomy is restricted to managerial decisions,
within legal and financial boundaries. For example, they can use an accrual
accounting system and save ‘profits’ from one year for investments in the next
5 Land commissions, universities, chambers of commerce, police regions, museums, food quality control
agencies, and adult and vocal training centers.
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year—to a maximum of 5% of total revenues. Contract agencies cannot however
borrow money or participate in a limited company.
Independent Administrative Bodies (in Dutch: ZBOs) have more managerial
freedom than contract agencies. Almost all ZBOs have legal personality, based on
public (about 60% of cases) as well as private law (about 40%). Their performance is
only in part subject to ministerial accountability; the Minister of the parent
department is responsible for the policy that is implemented by the ZBO, the
decision to charge a ZBO with this task and the supervision of the ZBO. All other
aspects of performance—like customer service and target setting—are up to the ZBO.
Performance agreements are laid down in annual contracts or other documents.
Legal Entities with a Statutory Task (in Dutch: RWT) are statutory bodies with
legal personality, either based on public or private law. In practice, most of these
bodies are school boards. We have not included boards of primary and secondary
schools into our survey because their numbers would complicate statistical analyses
too much (about 2500 boards exist in The Netherlands). All higher education RWTs
were included though. Other examples of RWTs are museums and university
hospitals. RWTs are independent organisations, which are appointed by law to carry
out a particular public task for which they receive funding from the government.
Finally, government foundations (in Dutch: overheidsstichtingen) are foundations
established by or on behalf of the government, and were involved in some sort of
public task. Foundations have legal personality based on private law, and are
managed by a board. The Dutch government hardly ever appoints government
representatives on these boards. Foundations in our sample are on average small
organisations, partly run by volunteers. They include examples like organisations of
military veterans, and supporters of a museum. Several ZBOs and RWTs are also
government foundations; in case of overlap foundations have been listed only in the
ZBO or RWT category.
Measuring autonomy and political influence
Of the various dimensions of autonomy, such as policy, financial, structural,
personnel, and legal (see Christensen 2001; Verhoest et al. 2004), we will focus only
on policy and financial autonomy. Table 1 lists our measures. Organizations were
ranked high on policy autonomy if they can choose the target groups and
instruments for the policies they implement independently from the minister of
parent department, and when they are (pro)-actively involved in the policymaking
process. The financial autonomy of organizations was measured as the level of
discretion to obtain loans from the capital market; to set tariffs for products and/or
services; freedom to join partnerships with other entities under private law; to shift
between running costs and program costs on their budgets; and to shift their budget
over time, i.e. between budget years. Finally, we asked respondents to estimate the
influence on the agency by certain actors, by rating them on a 3-point scale (“To
what extent is your organization’s policies influenced by [actor’s name]?”, scale 1 =
not, 2 = to some degree, 3 = to a large degree). We have divided these actors as
governmental (i.e. parliament, cabinet, minister of parent department, minister of
finance, other ministers) and non-governmental actors (i.e. clients, interest groups,
consultants, media, public opinion).
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Results
We will first present findings on the relationship between formal and de facto
autonomy. For each type of public sector organization we have measured the mean
level of policy and financial autonomy, as our respondents perceive this. We then
move on to the perceived levels of influence as exerted by various governmental and
non-governmental actors. Finally, we will correlate the perceived levels of autonomy
with perceived levels of external influence.
Formal and de facto autonomy
To what extent does the formal autonomy of a public sector organization adequately
reflect the organization’s actual or de facto level of autonomy? Do organizations
with high formal autonomy, also have more de facto autonomy? Table 2 presents the
means and ANOVA statistics for policy autonomy. Only involvement in depart-
mental policymaking and the discretion to select policy instruments are statistically
significant different for the various types of organizations; the effect of selecting
instruments is the strongest. Furthermore, contrary to our expectation, de facto
policy autonomy does not increase with formal policy autonomy. Contract agencies
are more involved in departmental policymaking than governmental foundations,
and independent administrative bodies more than any other type of organization. We
Table 1 Description and measurement of policy and financial autonomy variables
Dimension of autonomy Operationalisation Survey question
Policy autonomy Discretion to choose
target group
Influence of organization on choice of
target groups (scale 1 = Ministry chooses
independently ... 5 = Organization
chooses independently)
Discretion to choose
policy instrument
Influence of organization on choice of
policy instrument (scale 1 = Ministry
chooses independently ... 5 =Organization
chooses independently)
Involvement in
policymaking process
To which extent is organization involved in
policy making? (scale 1 = not at all …
5 = always, we take often initiative)
Financial autonomy Obtaining loans from
capital market
Can the organization obtain loans
independently? (scale 1 = no, 2 = after
approval of ministry, 3 = yes)
Setting tariffs for
products & services
Can the organization set tariffs for products
and services independently? (scale 1 = no
Participation in
private entities
Can the organization participate in private
entities independently? (scale 1 = no2 = after
approval of ministry, 3 = yes)
Shifting running &
program cost budgets
Can the organization shift its budget between
running and program costs independently?
(scale 1 = no2 = after approval of ministry,
3 = yes)
Shifting budgets
over time
Can the organization shift its budget over
time independently? (scale 1 = no2 = after
approval of ministry, 3 = yes)
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would expect that the closer an organization is to the minister (i.e. less formal
autonomy), the less policy autonomy it would have. However, these findings suggest
that closeness to the policymaking center is more important than having (formal)
autonomy.6
This effect is replicated for the discretion to select target groups; organizations at
a greater distance from the ministerial department report higher levels of discretion
(although n.s.). There appears to be a divide between contract agencies on the one
hand and other public sector organizations on the other hand. Being at arms’ length
significantly affects the respondents’ perception of autonomy.7 In sum, there is no
linear relationship between formal and de facto autonomy. Distance from the
ministerial department as such is not reflected in the levels of policy autonomy.
Table 3 presents the findings for financial autonomy. Except for setting tariffs and
shifting budgets over time, contract agencies enjoy the least autonomy from their
parent department compared to the other organizations. Contract agencies have
lesser degrees of autonomy when it comes to obtaining loans from capital markets,
the discretion to participate in private entities such as public–private partnerships,
and the shifting between running and program costs within their own budget without
prior consent of the parent department. Regarding the autonomy to shift budgets
over time, contract agencies have been explicitly designed so as to be freed from the
input line-item budgets (Van Thiel and Pollitt 2007).
The most remarkable finding in this table is therefore perhaps the observation
that contract agencies enjoy substantially more discretion to set tariffs than inde-
6 A multiple comparisons test shows that two groups differ from each other, i.e. independent
administrative bodies and legal entities with a statutory task, albeit in a very weak sense as p=0.063.
This is confirmed by a t-test: t=2.963, p=0.023.
Table 2 Actual involvement in policy-making and use of policy-making discretionary power to select
target groups and policy instruments vis-à-vis own ministry, measured per type of organization
Type of organization Involvement in
policymaking:
Discretion to select
target groups: Mean
Discretion to select policy
instruments: mean
Contract agencies 3.27 (0.65) 3.55 (1.21) 3.90 (1.37)
Independent administrative bodies 3.72 (0.97) 4.40 (1.43) 5.09 (0.99)
Legal entities with statutory tasks 3.00 (1.06) 4.48 (0.85) 5.00 (0.57)
Government foundations 3.19 (1.26) 4.43 (1.10) 4.32 (1.22)
F=3.157 F=1.709 F=5.681
p=0.027 p=0.169 p=0.01
Total (N) 122 115 102
For involvement: 0 = Not at all and 5 = Always, because we often take initiative ourselves. For both
policy autonomy measures: 0 = Ministry takes most decisions, independent from us, and 6 = We take all
decisions, no involvement ministry. Organizations belonging to a cluster have been ascribed the mean
value of their cluster (note: none of the contract agencies belongs to a cluster). We found no significantly
different results. Means, standard deviations in brackets
7 A multiple comparison test shows that the mean differences between contract agencies and independent
administrative bodies (p=0.010) and between the latter and government foundations (p=0.017) differ
significantly for each other. If we relax the level of significance we also find that the mean differences
between contract agencies and legal entities with a statutory task (p=0.059) significantly differ from each
other.
Political Influence and Bureaucratic Autonomy 145
pendent administrative bodies (ZBOs 2.08 versus contract agencies 1.86, but n.s.
based on a multiple comparison test). The majority of legal entities with statutory
tasks and government foundations are institutes of higher learning that set their
tariffs for academic years and other courses, which explains these categories’ high
ranking.
In conclusion, although not all differences are statistically significant, the findings
show that there is no linear relationship between the formal autonomy of an
organization and its de facto autonomy in a number of dimensions of policy and
financial autonomy. The findings suggest that in practice, public sector organizations
operate under different degrees of autonomy, regardless of their formal (legal)
position.
Formal autonomy and venues of influences
Next we will examine the respondents’ rating of the level of influence of external
political actors on their organization. We expect that organizations with more formal
autonomy will report a lower level of influence from political actors. The results are
displayed in Table 4. Except for the influence of the cabinet and interest groups,
none of the findings are statistically significant (at the 90% and/or 95% level).
Table 4 leads to the following observations. First, the minister of the parent
department is seen as the most influential political actor. This is what we could expect
on the basis of the formal power structure within parliamentary systems. If we look at
the means for each type of organization, we see that ministerial influence is reported
highest, again as expected, by contract agencies followed by legal entities with a
statutory task, independent administrative bodies and government foundations.
Second, the political actor that is overall rated as having the lowest level of
influence is, surprisingly, the minister of finance (1.59). This is unexpected as the
minister of finance is generally considered as one of the main veto players, next to
the prime minister. Still, and as expected, of the different types of organizations,
Table 3 Mean rankings of degrees of various measures of financial autonomy
Type of
organization
Obtaining loans
for investment
Setting tariffs
for products
and services
Participation
in private
entities
Shifting running
and program
cost budgets
Shifting
budgets
over time
Contract agencies 2.17 (0.83) 2.08 (0.49) 1.69 (0.75) 1.83 (0.72) 2.38 (0.65)
Independent
administrative
bodies
2.42 (0.78) 1.86 (0.73) 2.00 (0.72) 2.36 (0.76) 2.34 (0.75)
Legal entities
with statutory
tasks
2.80 (0.17) 2.40 (0.15) 2.76 (0.28) 2.83 (0.05) 2.84 (0.27)
Government
foundations
2.67 (0.73) 2.70 (0.66) 2.50 (0.81) 2.63 (0.67) 2.35 (0.79)
F=3.416 F=15.509 F=11.478 F=7.576 F=3.405
p=0.019 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.020
Total (N) 138 135 139 126 142
Can you ... 1 = No, 2 = Only after approval of ministry, 3 = Yes
Means, standard deviations in brackets
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contract agencies rate the minister of finance as the most influential actor compared
to other agencies.
One explanation for the low ranking of the finance minister may be that his
position is equated with cabinet (2.39). The minister of finance plays a pivotal role in
the cabinet’s collective decision-making (Andeweg and Irwin 2005). Finally, the
overall mean rankings show that the most influential actors on organizational
policymaking are the clients of the organizations and interest groups within their
environment (2.27 and 2.06, respectively). Overall, this picture suggests that there
are pockets of policymaking, or policy communities, whose members have a large
say in the policies of the organizations. Ministers of the parent department, clients
and related interest groups are considered more influential than parliament, the
cabinet and other ministers, consultants and the media.
Who are the most influential actors per type of organization? For contract
agencies, the minister of the parent department is by far the most influential actor. In
the case of contract agencies this is not a surprise finding as contract agencies fall
under the full ministerial accountability. This probably also explains the lower
ratings by contract agencies of the influence of interest groups and the media; all
such contacts are handled by the parent department. Client groups, however, remain
highly influential. Some of the agencies are indeed providers of public services, such
as the Tax Service, Prison Service and the Patent Office.
Although the independent administrative bodies (ZBOs) did also rate the minister
of the parent department as the most influential actors, they rated cabinet,
parliament, the finance minister and other ministers substantially lower than contract
agencies. By contrast, ZBOs rated interest group influence much higher. This could
be explained by the ZBOs’ higher formal autonomy: as the minister is no longer
responsible for all aspects of policy implementation, it is more rational for interest
groups to approach independent administrative bodies than approaching the minister.
Moreover, in some cases interest group representativeness are appointed in the
boards or client panels of ZBOs. Overall, independent administrative bodies report
to be subject to the lowest degrees of influence by external actors (overall mean
influence score of 1.81).
Legal entities with a statutory task (RWT) seem to be most enmeshed in a web of
influence. The overall mean for this type of organization is 2.07. This can be
understood by recalling that most of these organizations are educational and research
organizations, falling under the ministry of education and sciences, a spending
department par excellence. These institutes require large sums of money and provide
services to a large group of clients, i.e. students. Educational institutions are
regularly subject to peer reviews of the quality of education and research.
Finally, whereas government foundations perceive themselves as relatively more
autonomous from political supervision (cabinet, minister of parent department,
finance minister and other ministers) they are more ‘vulnerable’ to outside influence
such as consultants, media and interest groups. Interestingly, the mean score for
parliamentary influence is more or less the same as for contract agencies.
In conclusion, like before our findings show a more mixed and complex
relationship between political influence and formal autonomy than one would
expect on the basis of the organizations’ formal autonomy. First, in certain cases
organizations with low formal autonomy report lower levels of influence than
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organizations with high formal autonomy and vice versa. Second, organizations
with higher levels of formal autonomy did not report higher levels of influence
from non-governmental actors and vice versa. Overall however formal political
actors are rated as more influential than non-governmental actors. This is a
corroboration of the previous findings of Furlong and Waterman et al. We will
return to this point in the concluding section.
Political influence and bureaucratic autonomy
Finally, we have come to the third and final question: are organizations with more
autonomy influenced less by actors in their environment? To answer this question
we will examine the correlations between the levels of influence exerted by various
actors and the various dimensions of autonomy. Table 5 presents the values of
statistically significant correlations.
As for policy autonomy, we can make two observations. First, public
organizations that are more involved in policymaking report a higher level of
influence by the parent department’s minister, other ministers and interest groups.
This seems understandable as these are probably the most important parties involved
in policy making. Second, other aspects of policy autonomy are negatively
correlated to influence by the Second Chamber (parliament), the minister of parent
department, the minister of finance, client groups and consultants. High influence of
these actors seems to be inversely related to agencies’ choosing target groups and
instruments for the policies they implement. Whereas our findings for parliament
and ministers match our expectations, the effect of consultant influence is less clear.
Perhaps consultants advise systematically to award lower levels of autonomy, or
offer only advice in line with ministerial preferences, i.e. the actors that usually hire
external consultants.
As for financial autonomy, there is—surprisingly—hardly any influence of core
political actors, except for the ability to shift between programme and running costs
(which is influenced negatively). Client groups on the other hand seem to have an
overall positive effect, suggesting that politicians delegate more financial autonomy
to public organizations with potentially influential client groups. Interest groups are
however of much lesser importance.
To sum up, we have again a mixed picture. Public sector organizations that report
higher governmental influence have less formal policy autonomy but more de facto
policy autonomy. Organizations with high degrees of financial autonomy are no
more or less influenced by governmental actors (except for shifting programme and
running cost budgets), but they do report consistently higher levels of client group
influence. Perhaps client group influence is used as a substitute for direct
governmental influence.
Conclusion
It has been proposed that decentralization, autonomization and specialization of
public tasks and delegation of extensive discretionary powers to public organizations
during the past decades would lead to a strong decline of the capacities of politicians
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to control the public sector. With more and more semi-autonomous public sector
organizations being created, the potential for bureaucratic drift is believed to
increase. However, despite the overwhelming attention that public sector reform
enjoys among academics and practitioners, the extent to which these semi-
autonomous organizations have become more de facto autonomous from their
political and societal environment has remained an empirical question. Therefore,
this paper has examined the relationship between formal and de facto autonomy, the
influence of a number of political actors on (semi)-autonomous public sector
organizations, and the relationships between these levels of influence and levels of
autonomy. Using survey data, we explored to which extent public sector
organizations are adrift and have become unresponsive to the most important
venues of influence in a parliamentary institutional setting.
Our study is explorative because little is known in comparison to the situation in
the US. We have found a number of important (preliminary) insights that justify
further research on this topic. In general, we have found the relationship between the
key concepts of autonomy and control are more complex and less straightforward
than generally thought of. First, the level of formal autonomy is not a straightforward
indicator of the level of actual or de facto autonomy. Second, organizations that are
formally located further away from the direct supervision of political stakeholders do
not always report lower levels of autonomy than organisations that are located in the
vicinity of political principals. Finally, our analysis has shown that higher levels of
political control suggest lower levels of policy and financial autonomy, but not for
each dimension of policy and financial autonomy. By the same token, higher levels
of societal influence are found to correlate positively with most forms of policy and
financial autonomy.
In comparison to the US studies, it is interesting to find that in a parliamentary
setting formal political institutions are rated as the most influential actors too. What
we do not know yet, however, is what the sources of the dominance of formal
political institutions are in both systems. The instruments of political control of
congress and president are different from those that ministers have in a parliamentary
system like the Netherlands. While studies like Furlong and Waterman et al. give
further insights into how political control in the US works, we need to ask the same
question for parliamentary systems.
This brings us to our final point. Our findings suggest that the central state is far
from “hollowed out”—has it ever been? Given the degree of influence that the
agencies in this survey ascribe to central governmental actors in comparison to
interest groups, clients and the media, we can infer that the center is still pretty much
in control of the various (semi)-autonomous agencies in the Netherlands. The
question remains is “how” is the center the dominant actor? The findings of studies
on regulation inside government and of studies on the implementation of the whole-
of-government and joined-up government are to some extent limited to the Anglo-
Saxon world (Pollitt et al. 2007). Applying the theoretical models from the US
literature to continental European systems could produce more insight into the
mechanisms of control and steering within parliamentary systems generally.
We conclude with more questions than answers. One of the main questions that
requires further research is to what extent levels of de facto autonomy correlate with
the level of political salience of issues that agencies address in their policy programs.
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This requires a more dynamic approach to autonomy and control than we could do
with our survey data. A more dynamic perspective could give us more precise insights
into how agencies respond to external stimuli that are potentially threatening to the
autonomy of the agency. In general, our study has shown that more systematic study is
needed on the nature and mechanisms of autonomy and on the responsiveness of
public sector organizations. Many of these organizations have far reaching policy and
adjudicative autonomy and have powers to decide in individual cases. Still we do not
yet know how these organizations make their decisions and whether these decisions
are reflective of some of the interests of citizens and groups in society.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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